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A Speedbump on the Information
Superhighway: Pushing Copyright Law
into the Online Era
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552

(M.D. Fla. 1993).
by Benjamin H. Eisenberg
eorge Frena owned and operated a small-scale subscription
bulletin board service ("BBS") 1 that was freely accessible
to customers online via telephone modem. 2 The BBS
functioned much like an online library, allowing customers who
had either paid a fee or purchased a certain amount of products
from Frena to connect via the Internet and "browse through
different BBS directories to look at pictures" and "download . . .
copies of the photographs . .. from Frena's computer onto their
home computer." 3 In addition to general file-sharing, one of the
BBS's more popular features was that subscribers could, among

G
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1
For a more in-depth description of how a BBS operates, see Timothy L.
Skelton, Internet Copyright Infringement and Service Providers: The Case for a
Negotiated Rukmaking Alternative, 35 SAN Drnco L. REv. 219, 225-26 ( 1998).
Playboy Enters. , Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
2
Id. Frena's actual fee for access was twenty-five dollars per month . Id. at 1558.
3
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other things, upload and download "adult content matter" to
and from Frena's BBS, and thus his computer. 4 Unbeknownst to
· Frena, however, users subsequently uploaded 170 copyrighted
photographs taken from fifty separate issues of Playboy Enterprises,
Inc.'s ("PEI") flagship magazine, Playboy. 5
In 1993, PEI filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging that Frena, by
virtue of owning and operating the website that contained the
copyrighted images, committed copyright infringement, trademark
infringement, and unfair competition. 6 In response to PEI's three
motions for partial summary judgment, Frena admitted that the
images were posted on the BBS, that the images were downloaded
from the BBS by users, that he had not obtained authorization to
display the images, and that the images were "substantially similar
to copyrighted PEI photographs." 7 Frena argued, however, 8 that
liability was nonetheless improper since he had not personally
uploaded the copyrighted photographs to the BBS and that
once he became aware of the situation through the summons, he
immediately removed the images from the website. 9 Judge Harvey
E. Schlesinger, 10 presiding for the District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, rejected Frena's argument, granting PEI's
three motions for partial summary judgment and holding Frena
strictly liable for all copyrighted images found on his website, even
though it was not shown that he personally uploaded the images,
authorized their addition, or even knew of their presence.11
4

5
6
7
8

9
10

11

Id. at 1554.
Id.
Id.
Id.
As discussed later in this Comment, Frena's argument ultimately raised an
issue of first impression for the federal courts. See David . Weiskopf, The Risks
of Copyright Infringement on the Internet: A Practitioner's Guide, 33 U.S.F. L. REv.
1, 20 (1998) ("The widely discussed Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena was the
first case to consider liability for direct copyright infringement by a defendant
conducting activity on the Internet."); see also infra note 47 and accompanying
text.
Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1554.
The Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger was nominated to the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida by President George H. W.
Bush on May 23, 1991. Judge Schlesinger assumed senior status on June 5,
2006. History oftheFederaljudiciary, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, http://www.fjc.
gov / servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=21l4&cid=53&ctype=dc&instate=fl (last visited July
6, 2012).
See Frena, 839 F. Supp. at 1556 (" [T] here is no dispute that
Defendant Frena supplied a product containing unauthorized copies of
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The Frena decision, although a straightforward application of
the traditional copyright law standard of strict liability, ignited an
outpouring of debate concerning the ramifications that such an
approach could have on the burgeoning modern "online society."
Scholars argued that Judge Schlesinger's decision, while an
application of proper precedent, was "innocent or naive as to the
policy considerations concerning liability on the Internet," 12 since
instantaneous uploads and downloads made the online context,
in their view, inherently "different" from the other means of
publication from which copyright law was derived. 13 In this regard,
Judge Schlesinger's holding proved to be an essential catalyst for
initiating a much needed national debate on the issue, eventually
resulting in the passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in
1998, which in turn largely rejected Frena's line of reasoning and
ushered copyright law into a new modern era.
Copyright Law and the Application of Strict Liability
Copyright law in the United States originates from Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution 14 and is primarily governed by the
Copyright Act of 1976 (1976 Act), which establishes "an exclusive
ownership right in a form of expression" through three means
of liability: direct infringement, contributory infringement,
and vicarious liability. 15 For direct infringement (and copyright
infringement generally), the plaintiff must show" ( 1) ownership of
a valid copyright, and (2) copying [by the defendant] of constituent

12
13
14

15

a copyrighted work. It does not matter that Defendant Frena claims he did
not make the copies himself."). While it is not the focus of this Comment, it
should also be noted that the Frena court also found the defendant liable for
trademark infringement and unfair practices. Id. at 1561-62.
Weiskopf, supra note 8, at 21.
See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.").
Justin Williamson, Online Service Provider Copyright Liability: Is the Digital
MiUennium Copyright Act the Answer?, 88 KY. LJ. 987, 989 (2000) (quoting Lewis
C. Lee & ]. Scott Davidson, InteUectual Property and the Internet, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY FOR THE I TERNET §§ 1.1, 1.7 (Lewis C. Lee &J. Scott Davidson eds.,
1997) ). See generally 17 U.S.C. (2006) (detailing the provisions of the 1976 Act).

Published by STARS, 2013

3

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 92 [2013], No. 2, Art. 17

340

FLORIDA HISTORICAL QUARTERLY

elements of the work that are original." 16 In this regard, direct
infringement, in the traditional sense, is a strict liability offense and,
_thus, "does not require intent or any particular state of mind." 17
Rather, knowledge is only instrumental in determining whether
a damages award should be reduced. 18 By contrast, contributory
liability expressly requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant
had knowledge that another party was engaged in infringing
activity and that the defendant "induce [ d], cause [d] or materially
contribute[d] to the infringing conduct." 19 Somewhat similarly,
vicarious liability focuses on whether the defendant had sufficient
ability to control and authorize the direct infringer's actions and
thereby received gains derived from that authorization. 20
Since "copying," as is required in the second prong for
copyright infringement, can rarely be shown through direct
evidence, courts have found that it "may be inferentially proven
by showing that [the defendant] had access to the allegedly
infringed work, that the allegedly infringing work is substantially
similar to the copyrighted work, ... and that one of the [exclusive]
rights statutorily guaranteed to copyright owners is implicated." 21
These "exclusive rights," as guaranteed to the copyright owners
by the courts, are delineated in Section 106 of the 1976 Act and
consist in part of "the right to reproduce the copyrighted work,
the right to prepare derivative works, the right to distribute copies
to the public, and the right to publicly display the work. "22 As a

16

17
18

19

20
21
22

Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citing
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985)); see
also 17 U.S.C. § 50l(a) (2006) (providing liability for "[a]nyone who violates
any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner").
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. etcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
See 17 U-8.C. § 504(c) (2) (2006) (stating that a court may reduce statutory
damages in certain situations in which the infringer "was not aware and
had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of
copyright").
Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc. , 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971) ; see also Noah Levine, ote, Establishing Legal Accountability for
Anonymous Communication in Cyberspace, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1526, 1544 (1996)
("The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement is not derived from the
language of the Copyright Act and is therefore a distinct concept developed
independently by courts.").
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375.
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993)_
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1367 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(3) & (5) (2006) ).
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result, it is well-established that "[e]ngaging in or authorizing
any of these categories without the copyright owner's permission
- violates the exclusive rights of the copyright owner and constitutes
infringement of that copyright." 23
In a traditional setting, such as with a printing press 24 or a
magazine publisher, courts routinely placed the onus on the
publisher to monitor its product and thus have "held distributers
and publishers strictly liable for any copyright infringement that
appeared in their publications." 25 In De Acosta v. Brown, 26 for
example, the defendant, a national magazine distributor, was held
strictly liable for unintentionally publishing a copyrighted short
story. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
basing its decision primarily on the overwhelming precedent,
recognized that it was "usual to hold an innocent publisher of a
copyrighted book liable [for direct infringement] ." 27 Thus, the
court reasoned that it was best to put the responsibility on the
publisher that "published [the copyrighted document] at its peril,"
regardless of the publisher's assertion of genuine ignorance. 28
To critics, such "traditional" precedent seemed distant when
applied to the budding spread of Internet usage, which theorists
argued could result in "unreasonable and impractical results." 29
Even before Frena, courts began questioning this logic in Internet

23
· 24

25
26
27
28
29

Frena, 839 F.Supp. at 1555-56(citing17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006)).
The Statute of Anne, which was codified in 1710 in Britain, represented the
origination of copyright law and "was an attempt to control the power of
the printing press." Darrin Keith Henning, "The Big Chill": The Supreme Court
Adopts an Inducement Standard for Third-Party Copyright Infringement Liability,
Leaving Innovation in the Cold, 29 U. ARK. LITrLE RocK L. REv. 165, 165 (2006)
("Technological innovation and copyrights are generally seen as being in
conflict, with copyright pitted against progress.").
Elizabeth Schuerman, Note, Internet Seroice Providers and CofrYright LiabilityDon't Touch! . .. Or at Least Not Too Much, 30 S. ILL. U. LJ. 573, 575 (2006).
146 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1944), cert denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945).
Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
Id. (quoting Am. Press Ass'n v. Daily Story Publ'g. Co., 120 F. 766, 768 (7th Cir.
1902), appeal dismissed, 193 U.S. 675 (1904)).
Schuerman, supra note 25, at 576; see also Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Law
and Social Dialogue on the Information Superhighway: The Case Against Copyright
Liability of Bulletin Board Operators, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 345, 349
(1995) ("Applying copyright law in a digitized environment creates both
conceptual and substantive problems. The conceptual problems reflect the
fact that copyright law tailors itself to address the special needs of the print
technology-needs rendered invalid in a digitized environment.").
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settings. In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuSeroe, lnc., 30 for example, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held, in
the context of defamation, that passive online BBS administrators
are not liable when the infringing actions are performed by
unaffiliated BBS members. In CompuSeroe, the plaintiff brought a
defamation suit against the owner and administrator of a real-time
chatroom when users anonymously posted defamatory statements
about the plaintiff. 31 The plaintiff did not allege that the defendant
made any of the statements, but rather that the defendant passively
allowed the statements to be posted without taking steps to
moderate effectively and police the website. 32 The defendant, on
the other hand, argued "it was a distributor ... , as opposed to
a publisher of the ... statements," and thus should not be held
strictly liable for the actions of others. 33
The CompuSeroe court declined the plaintiff's reasoning,
citing practicality concerns since "CompuServe ha[d] no more
editorial control over such a publication than does a public library,
book store, or newsstand, and it would be no more feasible for
CompuServe to examine every publication it carries for potentially
defamatory statements than it would be for any other distributor to
do so. "34 Specifically, the court noted that, " [o] bviously, the national
distributor of hundreds of periodicals has no duty to monitor
each issue of every periodical it distributes." 35 Since the defendant
30
31

32

33

34
35

776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y 1991).
Id. at 137-38. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted libel, business disparagement,
and unfair competition. Id. The defendant's website was similar to the BBS in
Frena in that it was an '"electronic library' that subscribers [could] access from
a personal computer or terminal. ... Subscribers [could] also obtain access to
over 150 special interest 'forums.'" Id. at 137.
Id. at 138. The defendant in Compuserve did not have a contract to review the
actions of users nor did the defendant have the "opportunity to review [the]
contents before [they were uploaded] into CompuServe's computer banks,
from which it [was made] immediately available to approved ... subscribers."
Id. at 137.
Id. at 139. In the context of defamation, one who "republishes defamatory
matter is subject to liability as if he originally published it." Id. (quoting Cianci
v. New York Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980)). On the other
hand, "distributors of defamatory publications are not liable if they neither
know nor have reason to know of the defamation. " Id. (quoting Lerman v.
Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y 1981) ).
Id. at 140.
Id. (quoting Lerman v. Flynt Distributing Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir.
1984) , cert denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985)). The court further stated that "[a]
computerized database is the functional equivalent of a more traditional news
vender." Id.
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did not have knowledge of the postings, the court reasoned that
applying a strict liability standard would be "an undue burden on
the free flow of information. "36
The Frena Decision: Initiating the Debate
By contrast, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida in Frena declined to follow this "practical"
reasoning in the context of copyright law, relying instead on a
literal interpretation of the 1976 Act to find strict liability as the
appropriate standard. 37 In Frena, it was not disputed that PEI had
copyrights for the photographs in question, that the photographs
had been uploaded to and downloaded from Frena's website, and
that the images were substantially similar to PEI's copyrighted
photographs. Thus, the accessibility and substantial similarity
elements of "copying," as are required for direct copyright
infringement, were effectively satisfied. 38
As to the third element, an implication of PEI's "exclusive
rights," the court found that, by virtue of having the photographs
on his website, Frena violated PEI's display and distribution rights. 39
In this context, the court defined the applicable distribution right
as "the exclusive right to sell, give away, rent or lend any material
embodiment of his work." 40 Since Frena had stored and shared the
images on the Internet, he had "supplied a product containing
unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work." 41 In the same vein,
the court also held that Frena violated PEI's display rights, which
the court defined as the "unauthorized transmission of the display
from one place to another, for example, a computer screen." 42

36

37
38
39
40
41
42

Id. As such, the Compuserve court held that, in the context of defamation, courts
must determine whether the defendant "knew or had reason to know of the
allegedly defamatory ... statements." Id. at 141. The court also found that the
defendant was not liable under a theory of contributory or vicarious liability
because the plaintiffs did not present any facts to show that the defendant had
reason to know of the defamatory statements. Id.
See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
See id. at 1556 ("There is no dispute that PEI owns the copyrights on th e
photographs in question .... Access to the copyrighted work is not at issue ....
Substantial similarity is also a non-issue in this case.").
See id. at 1556-57.
Id. at 1556 (quoting 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§ 8.11 [A],
at 8-124.1 (1993)).
Id.
Id. at 1557.
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Once again, since the images were available on the Internet, the
court held that the BBS was "open to the public" and accessible
· in a medium where "a substantial number of persons outside of
a normal circle of family and its acquaintances [are] gathered," 43
thereby satisfying the requirements for a display rights violation.
Despite the fact that PEI satisfied the necessary prongs to prove
direct infringement, and the case law distinctly demonstrated that
knowledge or volition is not an element of the offense, Frena
argued that his actions should be excused due to the passive nature
of his conduct. 44 The court rejected this argument, instead invoking
the traditional view that" [i] ntent or knowledge is not an element
of infringement, and thus even an innocent infringer is liable." 45
Furthermore, the court stated that, even in the context presented
in Frena, the element of knowledge was only of importance "when it
fixes statutory damages. "46 Thus, given the definitions of distribution
and display rights, the perceived realization from Frenawas that any
defendant owning a website could be held strictly liable for any
copyrighted items uploaded by an outside user-a realization that
many believed could result in massive national litigation.
The Movement Away from Frena
When Frena was decided in 1993, the Internet was in its infancy,
as is illustrated by the fact thatFrenawas a case of first impression for
the federal courts.47 Therefore, relying on a literal reading of the
1976 Act and a straightforward application of related precedent,
the Frena court's decision was not only the most logical outcome

43
44
45
46

47

Id. (quoting 2 NIMMER, supra note 40, § 8.14[C], at 8-169).
Id. at 1559.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (citing D.C. Comics, Inc. v. Mini Gift Shop, 912 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1990)). It
should be noted that the Frena court also rejected the defendant's argument
that the display of the images was a "fair use" because (1) Frena used the
website for a commercial purpose, to make money; (2) the images were exact
factual replications, rather than fantasy or fiction; (3) the photographs were an
essential part of the copyrighted work, Playboy magazine; and (4) the conduct
would greatly effect PEI's potential market. Id. at 1557-59.
See Kristin Ashurst Hughes, Cojryright in Cyberspace: A Survey of National Policy
Proposals for On-Line Service Provider Cojryright Liability and an Argument for
International Harmonization, 11 AM. U. J. I T'L L. & PoL'Y 1027, 1033 (1996)
(stating that, in the context of copyright law, "[r]eevaluation [wa]s necessary
to adjust the laws to this new mode of communication")
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but also was seemingly required under the law. 48 Legal theorists
and jurists, however, immediately contested this view, calling for a
change in policy based on the realization of the potential effects
the holding might cause during the rise of the new online age. 49
Distinctly, many recognized that distribution via the Internet
presents a separate problem from traditional, physical distribution
in that the Internet provides "prompt, accurate, and inexpensive
distribution of digital information means that practically anyone
can receive or disseminate" through remote personal computers at
any given time. 50 Most importantly, as was illustrated in Frena, the
Internet is distinct in that, unlike a hardcopy periodical distributor,
it allows outside users to easily and instantly upload (and download)
copyrighted information to a website on a massive basis without the
administrator's knowledge or authorization.
As a result, while several state and federal courts followed the
Middle District's lead, 5 1 the majority of courts quickly declined to

48

49

50

51

See supra notes 14-28 and accompanying text; see also Weiskopf, supra note 8, at
21 ("[Frena] might objectively be viewed as the most literal application of the
strict liability nature of the Copyright Act to Internet activity.").
See, e.g., Dexter M. Campbell, III, Internet Law-Surfing Without a Board? A
Look at Copyright Infringement on the Internet and Article I of the Digital Millennium
Act, 24 CAMPBELL L. REv. 279, 284-85 (2002) (discussing the "ridiculous"
repercussions that the Frena holding would hold for webpage owners); Bruce
W. Sanford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: The First
Amendment in an Online World, 28 CoN . L. REv. 1137, 1160 (1996) ("After
all, if a marketplace of ideas has ever really existed, the Internet is it, and
strict prohibitions against transferring ideas from one person to another
may gut the very promise the Internet offers."); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Seroice
Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the
First Amendment, 88 GEO. LJ. 1833, 1834 (2000) (noting that on the Internet
"practically anyone with access to a copyrighted work can duplicate it, adapt it,
or disseminate it").
Yen, supra note 49, at 1834; see also Sanford & Lorenger, supra note 49, at 1160
(arguing that extensive copyright protection "will only diminish the Internet's
value").
See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032,
1039 (S.D. .Y 1996) (finding a BBS owner was strictly liable when the owner
solicited customers and distributed the copyrighted product); Sega Enters. Ltd.
v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that a BBS operator was
liable after encouraging users to upload and download video games from the
website); State v. Perry, 697 N.E.2d 624, 628 (Ohio 1998) (citing Frena for the
proposition that exclusive rights were implicated because "[p]osting software
on a bulletin board where others can access and download it is distribution"
and "[p]osting also implicates the display rights of copyright owners").
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follow Frena's holding due to practicality concerns. 52 Most significantly,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held in Religi,ous Technowg;y Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications
Services, Inc. 53 that passive Internet service providers ("ISPs") should
not be held strictly liable for the actions performed by outside users
on the Internet service they provide. In Netcom, the plaintiffs, two
non-profit corporations, alleged that a former Church of Scientology
minister committed copyright infringement by posting copyrighted
texts from L. Ron Hubbard54 on a BBS. 55 The plaintiffs subsequently
joined the BBS administrator and the ISP, Netcom, when both refused
to forcibly remove the copyrighted items from the website after being
asked to do so. 56 Much like the reasoning in Frena, the plaintiffs stated
that Netcom had not voluntarily added the copyrighted material on
the website, but should nonetheless be held strictly liable because
Netcom had stored, and thus copied, the copyrighted materials onto
their own database.57
The plaintiffs were able to show that they had valid copyrights
for the materials, 58 and, relying on MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc., 59 that the defendant had "copied" the materials. 60 Nonetheless,
the Netcom court recognized the importance that Netcom did not
initiate the copying of the materials onto the database. 61 And while
Netcom had the theoretical power to monitor the website for
copyright infringement, it had chosen not to do so, instead opting

52

53
54

55
56
57
58
59
60
61

See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 622 (4th Cir.
2001) (requiring that the defendant know of the infringement even though
the plaintiff argued that Frena should apply); Playbo
y
Enters., Inc. v. Russ
Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512-15 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that a
volitional act on behalf of the ISP is required for direct infringement) .
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
L. Ron Hubbard controversially founded and developed the Church of
Scientology through a series of writings particularly focused on a self-help
system entitled Dianetics. See An Introduction toL. Ron Hubbard, LRo H UBBARD.
ORG, http: / / www.lronhubbard.org/ ronseries/ profile/ introduction.html (last
visited July 6, 2012).
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66.
Id. at 1366.
Id. at 1366, 1372.
Id. at 1367.
991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that saving data from storage to
random access memory (RAM) was copying).
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368.
Id. at 1368-69 ("[T]he mere fact that Netcom's system incidentally makes
temporary copies of plaintiffs' works does not mean etcom has caused the
copying.").
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to supply merely an Internet connection. 62 As a result, the Netcom
court refused to accept that there was a violation of an "exclusive
right" that triggered strict liability; rather, the court, much like
CompuServe, compared a service provider to a more traditional
means of distribution, finding that Netcom's relationship with the
offender was "not unlike that of the owner of a copying machine
who lets the public make copies with it." 63 Given the inherent
uncertainty and litigation costs of monitoring online databases, 64
the court recognized that "courts [should] analyze the machine
owner's liability under the rubric of contributory infringement, not
direct infringement," thereby requiring an element ofknowledge. 65
The Netcom court distinguished Frena, concluding that "the
[Frena] court was looking only at the exclusive right to distribute
[and display] copies to the public, where liability exists regardless
of whether the defendant makes copies." 66 The plaintiffs in Netcom,
on the other hand, focused their claim on the fact that Netcom
stored copies of the material on their database. 67 While the court
left the reasoning for the distinction between distribution and
display as against storage relatively unclear, the overarching effect
was that Netcom greatly retracted Frena's potential reach.
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Hardenburg, lnc., 68 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio furthered Netcom's
approach by holding that for ISPs to be held strictly liable for
copyright infringement, they must take affirmative steps to manage
their databases. In Hardenburg, the court found the defendant ISPs
strictly liable only after the defendants (1) encouraged outside users
to upload items to the website and (2) had a screening procedure
in which the defendants' employees viewed all of the files and
manually moved them onto the website. 69 The court found that" [ t]

62
63
64

65

66
67
68
69

Id. at 1368.
Id. at 1369.
See id. ("Plaintiffs' theory would create many separate acts of infringement
and, carried to its natural extreme, would lead to unreasonable liability."); idat
1372 ("[I]t does not make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the liability
of countless parties.").
Id. at 1369. Thus, the court held "there should ... be some element of volition
or causation which is lacking where a defendant's system is merely used to
create a copy by a third party." Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1370 (emphasis added).
Id.
982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
Id. at 513.
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hese two facts transform[ed the] Defendants from passive providers
of a space in which infringing activities happened to occur to active
·participants in the process of copyright infringement." 70 As a result,
a distinction was made between a passive operator and one that
encourages, in effect finding that ISPs that have policies to monitor
such behavior should be held accountable for their failings. 71

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Given the uncertainty created by the case law spawned from
Frena, interested parties lobbied for a firm national consensus that
resolved these divergent policy perspectives. 72 In 1998, Congress
reached a compromise in the form of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA"), which remains in effect today and
leaves the "current law in its evolving state" by creating a series
of "safe harbors," in the form of limited liability, for certain
common activities of service providers. 73 Specifically, Title II of
the DMCA, entitled the "Online Copyright Infringement Liability
Limitation Act," directly seeks to "clarif[y] the liability faced by
service providers who transmit potentially infringing materials
over their networks. "74
The DMCA states that service providers are given limited
liability in four distinct scenarios: " ( 1) transitory communications,

70
71

72

73
74

Id.
The court held that the defendants were liable because of "policies of active
participation in the infringing acitivities." Id. Subsequent cases have held that
there were specific circumstances in which a somewhat passive ISP could be
held liable for direct infringement. See, e.g., Playbo
y
Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld,
968 F. Supp. 1171 ( .D. Tex. 1997) (holding thata website owner was liable for
images posted by customers because, unlike Netcom, the website owner was
being paid for selling the images, not for providing internet); Playboy Enters.,
Inc. v. Webbworld, 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997), afj'd 163 F.3d 486 (5th
Cir. 1999) (same); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Sanfilippo, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1350 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (finding liability where the owner gave the third party
authorization).
As could be expected, the national debate pitted copyright owners and ISPs
against one another. Copyright owners embraced the ruling from Frena, which
would force service providers to actively police all of their websites for possible
infringement. Service providers, on the other hand, proffered a "notice and
take down" approach, whereby service providers could only be found liable
if the copyright infringement had been recognized and brought to their
attention. 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID IMMER, NIMMER o COPYRIGHT§
12B.Ol [B][2] (Mathew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2011).
Id.§ 12B.Ol [B] [3] (quoting S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998) ).
S. REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998).
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(2) system caching, (3) information stored on systems or networks at
the direction of users, and ( 4) information location tools." 75 First,
to be privy to such liability protection, the defendant must be a
"service provider" as defined by the statute. 76 Thereafter, the
service provider must (1) implement "a policy that provides
for the termination in appropriate circumstances of . . . repeat
infringers" 77 and (2) "accommodates and does not interfere with
standard technical measures. "78
More important, as related to Frenasituations, Section 512(c) of
the DMCA "protects service providers for information stored on its
system at the direction ofusers" 79 so long as the service provider"(!)
does not have actual knowledge that the material is infringing, (2)
does not receive a financial benefit from the infringing activity,
and (3) removed the infringing material expeditiously upon
notification." 80 Thus, the DMCA can be seen as a relative adoption
of the reasoning of CompuServe and Netcom in that purely passive
service providers are only liable when it is known that the service
provider had specific knowledge of the infringement.
While the reasoning of Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena was
ultimately severely narrowed by United States copyright law, the
case's relative importance is not in question. Through the passage
of the DMCA, purely passive BBS owners such as Frena are now
shielded from copyright liability so long as they act prudently
to remove copyrighted information when notified and are not
benefiting financially from the infringement. The effect, therefore,
is a compromise of sorts such that only those with a culpable mind
may be liable, thereby forcing "traditional" notions of copyright
law to give way to the information superhighway's seemingly iconic
free flow of information. Thus, as can be seen from the resulting
law, Frena, while at times heavily criticized, represented a crucial
first step towards conforming the law to the online conglomerate

75
76

77
78
79
80

Schuerman, supra note 25, at 580 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(a)-(d) (2006)
(emphasis added)).
As applicable to database owners such as Frena, a service provider is defined
as "a provider of online services or network access, or the operator of facilities
therefore." 17 U.S.C. § 512(k) (1) (B) (2006).
Id.§ 512 (i) (1) (A).
Id.§ 512 (i) (1) (B).
Schuerman, supra note 25, at580(citing17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006)).
Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(l)(A)(i-iii) (2006)).
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that society has become, fusing the old policy with new concerns,
and bringing legitimate copyright issues to the national forefront.
_A nd, in many ways, such is representative of the natural method
of copyright law, a never-ending battle where innovation leads the
way, leaving the law to later react and adapt. 81 As such, Frena can
be remembered as the bridge between these two phases, ushering
copyright law into the modem online era.

81

Determinations as to the requisite knowledge for the DMCA "safe harbors," for
example, still remain a hotly litigated issue for major Internet websites, such
as YouTube and Google. See, e.g., Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., Nos. 103270-cv, 10-3342-cv, 2012 WL 1130851, at *34 (2d Cir. Apr. 5, 2012) (holding
that the DMCA "requires knowledge or awareness of facts or circumstances
that indicate specific and identifiable instances of infringement").
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